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Abstract 
 
Over the past thirty years the industrialised West has witnessed a move towards space, heterogeneity and 
subjectivity in the criminological study of violence and homicide. Whilst large-scale quantitative studies of the 
temporal and spatial distribution of homicide continue to provide a broad empirical context, aetiological 
explanations tend to be based on analyses of the heterogeneous psychological interactions and experiences of 
individual subjects at the micro-level. However, mid-range studies of the temporal and spatial distribution of 
perpetrators and victims of homicide between unrelated adults have provided a useful link between the micro- 
and macro-levels. Focusing primarily on British homicide and serial murder, this article attempts to strengthen 
this link by combining contemporary micro-analyses of the subjective motives of perpetrators with mid-range 
analyses of space, which can therefore be seen as part of the structural tradition of theorising about homicide 
and serial murder. Placing these analyses in a broad underlying context constituted by major historical shifts in 
political economy and the cultural forms of ‘pseudo-pacification’ and ‘special liberty’ will lay the initial 
cornerstones for an integrated multi-level theory. 
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The principle put forward near the beginning of the era of ‘radical’ criminology, that we need 
a ‘fully social’ theory of deviance (Taylor et al, 1973), now seems inadequate. This was a 
premature call to present the sum before its parts were fully understood. We now know that 
we need far more detailed knowledge about those parts. Since then many attempts have been 
made to break down and integrate ‘the social’ and its structural relations of class, race, gender 
and age with other important intersecting dimensions such as historical process, political 
economy, culture, space, biography and subjectivity. Even biology has made something of a 
comeback, now in a form that is far more enlightened and sociologically aware than the 
previous lurches into crude determinism and eugenics that discredited the overall intellectual 
project (see Owen, 2012; Dickens, 2004).  
 
However, criminology still experiences difficulty in its attempts to construct theories of 
violence that can integrate the main three analytical levels: micro (subjective/psychological 
motivations and justifications); meso (local temporal/spatial patterns and cultural norms); and 
macro (large-scale historical and spatial patterns in underlying socioeconomic, cultural and 
political contexts). Previous attempts have produced valuable ideas but have tended to be 
rather one-dimensional. For instance, institutional anomie theory focuses on loss of meaning; 
differential association and sub-cultural theories focus on reproduction and excess of 
meaning; control theories focus on loss of control; general strain theory focuses on situational 
loss of opportunities; psychological theories of motivations focus on individual experiences, 
and so on (see Lilly et al, 2010; Hall, 2012 for critical sweeps across the canon of 
criminological theory). Of the classical theories, strain theory was probably the most 
successful in integrating the three analytical levels, but it lacked an adequate conception of 
space and inappropriately naturalised the ‘malady of infinite aspirations’ as the principal 
condition of subjectivity (Hall, ibid.). Integrated theories, which have been common in 
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criminology and sociology since Cloward and Ohlin’s (1960) combination of strain, 
differential association and sub-cultural theories, have produced some very interesting 
hybrids with potential for further development (see Akers and Sellers, 2004). However, this 
potential is hampered by the lack of reliable empirical data on all three levels of analysis and 
the difficulty of constructing concepts that are able to integrate these levels. These concepts 
are often ontologically specific to each level and the distinct philosophies and politics that 
underlie each traditional theory (see Hall, ibid.).  
 
Although violence is a broad and slippery concept, empirical studies of homicide are useful 
as a foundation for theoretical integration. Homicide is one of the fundamental ‘consensual 
crimes’ around which hard-line social constructionist explanations collapse to reveal a firmer 
object for empirical and theoretical attention. The vast majority of homicidal acts are 
discovered and recorded, thus statistical representations are more reliable than those that 
represent general crime and violence, which are more susceptible to variations in socially 
constructed definitions and irredeemably debased by a large estimated ‘dark figure’ of 
unreported and unrecorded incidents (Brookman, 2005; D’Cruze et al, 2006). Legal and 
cultural definitions of homicide are very similar across the nations and regions of the 
industrialised West, therefore cross-cultural and temporal comparisons of statistical rates can 
be made with more confidence (Barclay et al, 2003). However, despite the opportunities these 
relatively reliable data present, outside psychology the aetiological study of homicide 
nonetheless suffers from ‘academic neglect’ (Brookman, 2005: 1).  As a consequence, 
questions related to explaining what motivates one human being to kill another human being 
are seldom considered in their socioeconomic contexts within academic criminology or 
sociology, despite the popular fascination that this type of question generates.   
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Brookman’s observation is perhaps even more apt when we consider the relative dearth of 
academic interest in the phenomenon of serial murder in its socioeconomic contexts (for 
interesting psychologically-based explorations see: Beasley, 2004; Burgess, Hartman, 
Ressler, Douglas & McCormack, 1986; Hickey, 2006; Meloy, 2000; Myers, Gooch, & 
Meloy, 2005; Stone, 2001).   We employ throughout this article the standard academic and 
European definition of ‘serial murder’ as the killing of three or more victims within a period 
of greater than 30 days (Wilson, 2007) and continue Grover and Soothill’s (1999) and 
Wilson’s (2007; 2012) attempts to adopt a structural, as opposed to a relentless medico-
psychological  approach, to this phenomenon. 
 
Previous empirical studies of homicide rates have produced reasonably reliable data on two 
of the three levels of analysis, the macro and the meso. In European studies the most common 
representation at the macro-level is the palpable decline in homicide rates that Western 
Europe experienced throughout the early-modern and modern eras (see Eisner, 2011 for a 
statistical breakdown). Similar but more undulating declines can also be discerned in the 
United States of America on a more compressed time-scale from the mid-nineteenth century 
(see Roth, 2009; Hall and McLean, 2009). Underneath this empirical phenomenon is a 
complex array of shifting social relations, forms of political economy and cultural norms and 
values.  
 
We know that fluctuations in statistical homicide rates tend to coexist at specific points in 
time and space (Currie, 2009). Higher than average rates are found in spatial regions and 
locales that can be distinguished by their marginal positions in the socioeconomic structure. 
These positions have changed over time, and the variations follow a discernible pattern (see 
Hall and McLean, 2009; Marktanner and Noiset, 2013). For instance, there is little doubt that 
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since the 1970s, geographical spaces in the deindustrialised regions of Europe and the USA 
that have returned significantly higher rates of homicide have also suffered from economic 
disruption, increased unemployment, ethnic tensions, loss of credible political representation, 
a decline in cultural status, damage inflicted on vital social institutions such as family, 
housing and education and the growth of criminal markets (Dorling, 2004; Reiner, 2007; 
Parker, 2008).  
 
However, we still do not know enough about subjective motivations and whether or not they, 
rather than the opportunities to commit homicide, also vary over time. This is a crucial 
distinction because the theoretical and political polarity it implies is quite extreme. To 
suggest that only opportunities vary and there will always be a small number of killers ‘out 
there’ waiting to pounce on victims unless intrusive systems of security and protection are 
rigorously and indefinitely maintained buys into classical liberal and conservative fatalism. 
Conversely, to suggest that the propensity to kill, and by extension human nature itself, varies 
over time and space fits with a more optimistic liberal principle of a flexible human nature 
whose underlying benign orientation to others can be brought to the fore by creating and 
maintaining more equal and less aggressive underlying socioeconomic and cultural 
conditions. The difference in the political and policy programmes of general violence 
reduction suggested by either of these positions is polarised and qualitatively different; 
increased security and control over an innately errant human nature in a society determined 
by market forces versus some degree of progressive political intervention in underlying 
socioeconomic and cultural conditions. 
 
If this crucial question is to be answered, criminology must further its understanding of the 
subjective micro-level to the extent that it can recognise patterns in the rather daunting 
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variety of motivations and justifications that permeate this level, and begin to integrate these 
patterns more firmly with those already known to constitute the spatial/temporal meso-level 
and broad historical and structural macro-level. This article will argue that a firm focus on the 
victim, the victim’s socio-cultural relation to the killer and the spaces in which homicide 
between unrelated adults tends to be committed presents us with a potentially fruitful 
approach to an integrated theory.  
 
We will focus down further on serial killing, which, although an extreme and relatively rare 
form of homicide, can reveal specific subjective motivations and underlying cultural currents 
that are known to be associated with other forms of homicide in Europe and the USA 
(Wilson, 2007; Stein, 2007).    Our overall aim is to make a tentative move towards the 
construction of a provisional and probabilistic analytical nexus that connects the subjective, 
spatial and broad structural levels, in the hope that it can inform integrated theory 
construction in the future. By introducing to the debate the new concepts of pseudo-
pacification and special liberty (see Hall, 2012), which we fully define later, we also hope to 
propose a very basic outline of what we regard as the fundamental form of cultural mediation 
that pervades all liberal societies. These concepts will help to establish firmer and more 
plausible connections between the three analytical levels. 
 
 
The macro-level: structure, politics and culture 
 
In Western Europe and the USA there is a long tradition of social scientific macro-analyses 
of homicide that operate on the broad structural and temporal level. Western Europe seems to 
be characterised by a long-term decline in rates of homicide, which, depending upon the 
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specific region, commenced from various points between the 14th and 16th century and 
stretched to the mid-20th century (Eisner, 2011), from which point there have been undulating 
rises in most nations (Hall and McLean, 2009). The US homicide rate, however, has 
fluctuated in a more spectacular fashion in a condensed time period since the mid-19th 
century when reliable data began to be collected, and regional and local differences have 
tended to be greater (Roth, 2009; see also Monkonnen, 1989; 1997; 2001).  
 
Two very salient theoretical propositions emerge from Roth’s (ibid.) broad but regionally 
differentiated analysis of homicide in the USA, both of which echo Verkko’s (1951) classic 
observations in Europe. Firstly, whereas the rate of intimate homicide tends to be relatively 
consistent, temporal and spatial fluctuations in the rate of homicide between unrelated adults 
are significantly more pronounced, and thus seem to present us with a broad empirical 
framework for theorising significant changes in underlying probabilistic circumstances. 
Secondly, when all regional differentiations and complications are taken into account, four 
major forms of broad cultural mediation, which seem to link external circumstances at the 
macro-level to individuals’ interior subjective feelings, motivations and violent actions, 
correlate with reduced rates of homicide between unrelated adults: 
 
1. The general belief that government is stable, legitimate, representative and capable of 
protecting the person. 
2. An acceptable degree of trust in the individuals who run government and public services. 
3. The broad existence of empathy arising from social and political solidarity. 
4. The belief that one’s position in society is satisfactory, and one can command respect 
without resorting to violence. 
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This cultural framework relates to Elias’s (1994) theory of the ‘civilizing process’, a concept 
born in his attempt to explain the long-term decline in general brutality and the rise of non-
violent social interaction in Western Europe. This theory sets out the underlying political and 
sociological prerequisites upon which these mediatory psycho-cultural forms are dependent:  
 
1. A legitimate state that monopolises the right to use violence 
2. The maintenance of ‘figurations’, or a broad network of interdependent and thus friendly 
and empathetic social relations  
3. The maintenance of behavioural codes that insist on civility and non-violent interaction  
 
However, Elias’s critics, such as Mucchielli (2010), Ray (2011) and Weiviorka (2009), argue 
that his set of prerequisites underplays the vital importance of socioeconomic equality, the 
institutionalisation of welfare and education, and the institutionalisation and resulting 
pacification of the potentially violent socio-political conflict that characterised Western 
nations up to World War II. Should these institutional forms malfunction, the maintenance of 
Elias’s three prerequisites is very difficult. Roth (2009: 473) dismisses the ‘performance of 
the economy’ as a factor in violence reduction, yet, in the USA and Western Europe, over 90 
per cent of homicides occur in locales of socioeconomic disadvantage, and many are 
associated with some form of economic crime (Hall and McLean, 2009; Marktanner and 
Noiset, 2013). We suggest that Roth set up  a straw target that ignores Durkheim’s and 
Merton’s warning that there are no simple economic ‘cures’ for crime if ‘economy’ is 
expressed in such crude material terms (see Hall, 2012). It is not the level of material 
production but the relative equality of socioeconomic relations – signified not simply by a 
more even distribution of material products and economic opportunities but also by social 
solidarity and equality of political participation and cultural status – that should be considered 
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as the main macro-factor associated with lower rates of crime and violence (Ray, 2011). 
Without this, political legitimacy, social stability and interpersonal empathy are less likely, 
especially in conditions of extreme inequality (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010; Currie, 1985).  
 
Another important factor alongside equality is stability. Surveys of homicide rates across 
Europe and North America indicate very clearly that relatively stable social democratic 
nations such as Sweden and Germany, residual social democracies such as the UK and 
Canada, and conservative corporatist nations such as Italy and Spain, all experience notably 
lower rates than unstable deregulated neoliberal societies such as post-1971 USA and post-
Soviet Russia (Hall and McLean, 2009). In the USA’s social democratic period from 1937 to 
1980 the homicide rate and general crime rate were cut in half. The homicide rate doubled in 
1980 and reached a higher peak in 1991 as neoliberal economics devastated many urban 
industrial areas and created space for expanded criminal markets, most notably in illegal drug 
distribution (Currie, 1985). Since the mid-1990s the general crime and homicide rates have 
been returned closer to those of the social democratic period, but this has been achieved only 
in the midst of a significant increase in imprisonment rates and supervisory programmes, and 
huge investments in the therapeutic state – significant numbers of young people 
inappropriately prescribed Ritalin, Prozac or atypical anti-psychotics (Breggin, 2012) – and 
in the surveillance and securitisation of public space (Coleman and McCahill, 2011). In the 
social democratic era, these intrusive pacifying measures were far less prominent yet 
homicide and overall crime rates were significantly reduced. This reduction occurred as the 
traditional political struggles that characterised this era temporarily established increased 
socioeconomic equality, political participation, full employment and publicly-funded welfare, 
health and education systems.  
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Socioeconomic stability, political rights, low crime rates, low incarceration rates and less 
intrusive forms of surveillance could be seen across the whole of the industrialised West in 
what Bauman (2000) called the ‘golden age’ of post-war consensus (see also Reiner, 2007). 
According to Currie, social democratic politics alleviated many of the primary probabilistic 
conditions that correlate with high rates of violence and homicide:  
 
[An] especially violent society would surely contain these elements: It would separate 
large numbers of people, especially the young, from the kind of work that could 
include them securely in community life.  It would encourage policies of economic 
development and income distribution that sharply increased inequalities between 
sectors of the population.  It would rapidly shift vast amounts of capital from place to 
place without regard for the impact on local communities, causing massive 
movements of population away from family and neighborhood supports in search of 
livelihood.  It would avoid providing new mechanisms of care and support for those 
uprooted, perhaps in the name of preserving incentives to work and paring 
government spending.  It would promote a culture of intense interpersonal 
competition and spur its citizens to a level of material consumption that many could 
not lawfully sustain (1985: 278) 
 
Homicide rates also tend to vary across nations, regions and locales that differ in their ability 
to counteract the cultural factor of intense interpersonal competition with an alternative 
culture of empathy and solidarity, one of the main reasons ‘why some places are more 
dangerous than others’ (Currie, 2009: 4).  Nations that have undergone rapid transitions to 
neoliberal market economies, which caused socioeconomic instability, widening inequality 
and the intensification of competitive individualism, such as post-Soviet Russia and the 
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former Soviet satellite states of Eastern Europe in the 1990s, have also experienced notable 
increases in crime, homicide and imprisonment rates (Lafree and Tseloni, 2006; Volkov, 
1999; Gerber and Hout, 1998). For Currie, the most important generalisable probabilistic 
factors that consistently fit the evidence are:  
 
1. deep socioeconomic inequality  
2. marginal work 
3. weak social supports  
4. strained families  
5. harsh and ineffective criminal justice systems   
6. easy access to firearms   
 
Currie’s basic schema has been corroborated by numerous quantitative and qualitative studies 
(see Braithwaite and Braithwaite, 1980; Blau and Blau, 1982; Dorling, 2004; Reiner, 2007; 
Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010; Ray, 2011; Wilson, 2007; Hall and McLean, 2009; Marktanner 
and Noiset, 2013). The upshot of this macro-level position is that in periods and spaces where 
citizens feel poorly represented by their governments and Currie’s six conditions also apply, 
overall rates of homicide, particularly rates of homicide between unrelated adults, are 
significantly higher. This schema is more expansive, more contextualised and has more 
sociological depth than Roth’s four cultural macro-variable and Elias’s three sociopolitical 
macro-variables. However, other Western nations suffer from socioeconomic instability and 
spatially distributed inequality and have easy access to firearms, yet they maintain relatively 
low homicide and imprisonment rates (see Hall and McLean, 2009).  To begin to solve this 
problem we must return to Currie’s earlier work (1985; 1997), where he suggests that the 
USA’s more intense culture of competitive individualism might be the crucial factor that 
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makes simultaneous contributions to its relatively high homicide rate by normalising 
aggressive human interaction, and to the reproduction of the probabilistic contexts in which 
this higher rate tends to appear.  
 
Theorists who have attempted to provide simple socio-structural explanations of violence and 
homicide have been unconvincing. For instance, Connell (1995) points out the fact that 
public violence tends to be committed by men, and goes on to explain male violence in 
economically run-down locales as a product of ‘protest masculinity’, the physical expression 
of frustrated and inarticulate dissent against the forces that have created political and 
socioeconomic exclusion. This is simply the uncritical application of the paradigmatic idea 
put forward by Taylor et al (1973) that violent crime is a misguided form of proto-political 
dissent. Elliot Leyton (1986) adopts a similar approach in his theory of serial murder, 
suggesting that since 1945 it has been a form of ‘homicidal protest’ acted out by frustrated 
male members of the upper working and lower-middle classes who tend to kill victims from 
the middle classes. Despite the popularity of this broad theoretical explanation, it simply does 
not work as an explanation of violence, homicide or serial murder in Britain. Leyton does 
acknowledge that ‘[o]ccasionally …[serial killers] continue a metaphor from the earlier era 
and discipline unruly prostitutes and runaways’ (1986: 297), but he goes on, ‘[m]uch more 
commonly … they punish those above them in the system – preying on unambiguously 
middle-class figures such as university women’ (ibid.). However, as Grover and Soothill have 
argued:  
 
The British experience certainly does not confirm the latter aspect of the Leyton 
thesis.  … the victims of modern British serial killers are not from the relatively 
powerful middle classes, but are from relatively powerless and vulnerable groups – 
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children and young adults; gay men; women (particularly those vulnerable through 
their work in the sex industry or on account of the breakdown of familial relations); 
and pensioners.  In fact, the general absence of persons from relatively powerful 
positions is especially noticeable (1999: 12).   
 
It is rare that a sociological analysis is diametrically opposed to the truth.  However, recent 
work by philosophers and social theorists suggests that most acts of serious violence, 
homicide and serial killing are not misguided proto-political protests but born of conformity 
to capitalism’s ‘obscene Real’, a term that means the system’s functionally active yet 
systematically disavowed exploitative, predatory and violent drives (see Žižek, 2008; Hall et 
al, 2008; Hall, 2012). However, even when the possibility of conformity is acknowledged, it 
is difficult to see this type of illegitimate violence as part of a general ‘hegemonic’ strategy 
that functions to maintain a hierarchal social order. Connell (ibid.) points out that systemic 
violence permeates the current social order, but links the bottom to the top by focusing on the 
intersecting gender order; all men, she argues, benefit from the ‘patriarchal dividend’ because 
the violence they use to maintain dominant positions over women and less aggressive men at 
various points in the social order is legitimised by patriarchal culture. However, although this 
can have some purchase as an explanation of domestic violence and other forms of male 
violence in private spheres, it makes little sense in the public sphere. Firstly, traditional male 
culture systematically discredits those who inflict violence on more vulnerable individuals 
(Jefferson, 2002). Secondly, only a minority of men commit acts of serious violence in the 
public sphere and, thirdly, in largely pacified Western societies, physical violence is 
ineffective as both a localised and an overall dominance strategy (Hall, 2002). 
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Murderers and serial murderers transgress these cultural prohibitions and rationales and 
therefore fail to conform to traditional masculine or indeed feminine cultural codes. In a 
culture that is unforgivingly competitive yet legitimises only non-violent, rule-bound 
aggression in public life, what they do is distinctly anti-hegemonic. While 
acknowledging Leyton's basic ‘structural approach’, Wilson (2007), building on the work of 
Grover and Soothill (1999), quoted above, offers a victim-centred perspective on the 
phenomenon of serial killing. Specifically, he considers the 375 victims of British serial 
killers since 1960 and notes that, while most of the victims of male homicide between 
unrelated adults have been other men (see Hall, 2002), serial killers are different insofar as 
they have overwhelmingly targeted just five groups in British society: gay men; the elderly; 
babies and infants; sex workers; and, finally, a group that he describes as ‘runaways and 
throwaways’. Four of these five groups are dominated by women and girls and Wilson argues 
that the group targeted most frequently by British serial killers are elderly women, just under 
70 per cent of victims killed within this time-frame (Wilson, 2007: 55). However, despite 
these distinguishing factors, there is an interesting structural homology between victims of 
homicide between unrelated adults and victims of serial murderers – they tend to be 
vulnerable, from excluded populations and relatively unprotected.  
 
Weiviorka’s (2012) claim that we should take the victim perspective more seriously rings 
true, because it can inform theories of motivation by identifying patterns of offending and 
illuminating the subjectivities involved in victim-offender relations. Here, the victim’s 
marginalised social position can be brought into clearer relief by relating it to the cultural 
macro-factor of competitive individualism (Currie, 1985; 1997). Social inequality is the 
product of a system constituted by various social axes of domination, but, in a liberal-
democratic system, even though that inequality can be reproduced over time by the inherited 
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privilege that restricts social mobility, the system is relatively open. The configuration of 
winners and losers and the spaces they inhabit are the outcomes of an ongoing competitive 
struggle (Winlow and Hall, 2006; Hall, 2012). If the vulnerable victims of homicide between 
unrelated adults and methodical predatory killing consistently occupy the position of ‘the 
loser’ in this competitive struggle, we need to understand its forms and relations in finer 
analytical detail.  
 
The concept of competitive individualism is well known in social science, but few analyses 
have examined its basic rules and internal dynamics. If competitive struggle between 
individuals for wealth and status is indeed the dominant hegemonic norm in Western 
societies, although its intensity varies between nations and regions, that same norm demands 
that the struggle should be acted out in pacified non-violent ways.  For us, this indicates that a 
dynamic tension underlies what Elias described as the ‘civilizing process’. The concepts of 
pseudo-pacification and special liberty will help to explain this tension and further our 
understanding of the vital cultural macro-variables that attend the socioeconomic and 
political macro-variables outlined above. The pseudo-pacification process has been 
explicated in fine detail elsewhere (Hall, 2007; 2012), but here a brief summary will provide 
some important contextualisation for the long-term empirical decline in homicide that has 
been a consistent feature of Western Europe.  
 
European Feudal societies were structured by ‘righteous violence’ (Maddern, 1992), the 
everyday use of which, in the forms of fatal or seriously injurious punishment or armed 
assaults, was restricted to the ruling elite. In England, political and economic systems were 
destabilised after the fall of Rome and again after the Norman invasion. In the aftermath of 
both disruptive periods systems of monopolisation and legitimisation broke down and the 
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social use of violence became chaotic and poorly regulated, which hampered production, 
property rights and the trading of private property (Ward-Perkins, 2005).  
 
Edward 1’s reorganisation of regulation and criminal justice after 1274 reduced rates of 
violence, enhanced the protection of property rights, and increased the security and therefore 
the functionality of trading nodes and arteries. Political violence increased the homicide rate 
in the late 14th century, but after the plague, when expanded economic opportunities in a 
reduced population were combined with a developing rule of law and the state’s 
monopolisation of serious violence, the rate began its long historical decline. These economic 
opportunities enhanced social mobility, which, because physical violence was more 
successfully regulated, was achieved by early forms of entrepreneurialism. This new culture 
of entrepreneurial individualism was abetted by the introduction of the laws of primogeniture 
and entail throughout the social structure, which effectively ejected children from the 
defensive familial/communal unit as soon as they had reached adulthood, thus increasing 
sentiments of personal anxiety. This cell-like splitting of traditional social units also atomised 
and expanded libidinal drives, forcing anxiety-driven personal ambition to be democratised 
and sublimated into a non-violent competition for socio-symbolic status, which was achieved 
by successful personal performances in markets and displayed by conspicuous consumption.  
 
The English protected property, expanded production and trade and intensified consumer 
desire by sublimating physical violence, establishing a culture of non-violent yet aggressive 
sociosymbolic competition amongst atomised individuals and, by loosening up the social 
hierarchy, encouraging it to diffuse and proliferate throughout the social order. This process 
took hold over different time-spans in Western Europe, but England’s head-start firmly 
established the culture of pseudo-pacified competitive individualism and eroded traditions of 
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collectivism. Although Italian city-states such as Venice were the first in Europe to develop 
fully-blown commercial activity, most continental European regions, in which the laws of 
primogeniture and entail applied solely to the ruling class, were forced to deal with higher 
levels of violence, banditry and other forms of defensive-aggressive collectivism in civil 
society up to the 16th century and beyond, whilst England’s more firmly established pseudo-
pacified culture laid the foundations for an accelerated run-up to industrialisation. 
 
Thus pseudo-pacified behaviour did not establish itself for the sake of some civilizational 
ideal, nor in the name of some transcendental love of peace and resistance against 
domination, but to perform the dual function of protecting property rights to enhance trade 
and creating a pacified form of social competition that fuelled consumer culture and 
increased demand in burgeoning markets. Over the course of modernity, competitive 
individualism, shorn of legitimate physical violence yet still aggressive and hierarchal in a 
more fluid social structure, could be brought to the centre of the socioeconomic system as a 
dominant cultural norm and dynamic drive. This was not a ‘civilizing process’, nor even a 
pacification process, but a pseudo-pacification process established and reproduced as the 
cultural fuel for economic dynamism. As such, it rendered the pseudo-pacified subject and its 
non-violent relations with others in a state of tension, over-dependent for its complicity with 
civilising norms and laws and the constant expansion of opportunities for wealth, expressive 
hedonism and the achievement of social status by means of conspicuous consumption.  
 
The aristocratic love of libidinal liberty and conspicuous displays of superior status, which 
Veblen (1994) noticed still alive and well amongst successful entrepreneurs in the late-19th 
‘gilded age’ in the USA and Europe, were diffused and democratised in a competitive 
socially-mobile entrepreneurial economy and a consumer culture of ‘affordable luxury’. 
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However, successful entrepreneurs also carried forward the aristocratic sense of privilege and 
supremacism in a modified cultural form now associated with their commercial activities, 
which can be captured in the term special liberty (see Hall, 2012). This is a master signifier 
that legitimises and justifies wealth-creating and expressive activities that often risk harm to 
others, and establishes a culture of Rousseauean amour propre, in which the individual 
understands his social status only in relation to the downfall of others (Hall et al, 2008). 
Although law does not necessarily legitimise the exploitation, negligence, lack of health and 
safety, environmental degradation, social disruption and so on caused by competitive 
business enterprise, the constant difficulty law faces in convicting business owners and 
managers constitutes a ‘crisis of enforcement’ (Tombs and Whyte, 2008). Special liberty is a 
condensation of the dark side of liberal individualism (see Fish, 2010), the conviction that the 
individual, once his high moral and functional importance is established in his own mind, is 
exempt from social responsibility and can do what he or she wants, even when the 
gratification of material or expressive interests risks harm to others.  
 
Pseudo-pacification and special liberty together constitute the powerful and historically 
specific libertarian macro-cultural current that underlies modernity and capitalism. In this 
current extreme forms of negative freedom (rights) have been institutionalised and 
democratised to allow extreme forms of positive freedom (desires) to flourish and fuel 
consumer markets. The resulting dynamism is economically potent yet psychologically, 
culturally and socially unstable, and therefore requires sophisticated and intrusive forms of 
external securitisation to keep its restless forces in check (Hall, 2012; see also Crogan, 2010). 
An understanding of this cultural current allows us to understand the complex dynamics that 
constitute and energise the Western form of competitive individualism and make another 
important macro-correlation.  Namely, that Western nations, regions and locales in which this 
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macro-cultural current is especially powerful, opportunities for expressive hedonism and 
social advancement are relatively sparse, and in which mechanisms of informal control and 
formal securitisation and protection are under constant strain – such as the USA and Russia in 
the neoliberal era – suffer from high rates of homicide and spates of serial killing (Wilson, 
2007; Holmes and DeBurger, 1988; Holmes and Holmes, 1994; Fox and Levin, 2005).  
 
 
The meso-level: locale and situation 
 
To develop these macro-level correlations, processes and concepts into a tentative multi-level 
theory of causation they must be connected to the meso- and micro-levels. Social scientists 
are aware that social inequality and the other macro-variables identified above fluctuate 
across time and are distributed across space as well as the standard social axes of class, 
gender, ethnicity and age. Dorling’s (2004) research in Britain echoes that of Parker (2008) in 
the USA. Parker reminds us that after the US homicide rate reached 20th century peaks in 
1980 and 1991 it entered a period of decline from the mid-1990s, alongside the general 
statistical crime rate. However, this decline, just like the sharp rises between the mid-1970s 
and early 1990s, was unevenly distributed across space. Across the West relatively poor, run-
down deindustrialised zones continued to return homicide rates consistently higher than the 
national average (see Dorling, 2004; Reiner, 2007).  
 
In economically unstable and culturally competitive neoliberal economies the macro-
variables, outlined above, which are essential to the maintenance of non-violent interpersonal 
relations, are all eroded at the macro-social level (Hall, 2007; Wilson, 2007). However, this 
erosion can be extreme in specific run-down regions and locales. An analysis of the 
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autotomic production of space (Atkinson and Parker, 2011) can help to connect macro-
variables to the micro-variables that relate to both homicide and serial killing. 
 
One-off killers, serial killers and those who commit various acts of serious violence that incur 
substantial penalties all want to avoid the consequences of detection. The deterrent effect of 
the public gaze – whether the conduit is technological surveillance, the presence of police and 
security staff or simply the presence of other people – can to some extent reduce acts of 
murder, serious violence and altercations or risky activities that can lead to manslaughter and 
other forms of accidental death (Hobbs et al, 2003). However, serial killers, driven to act out 
extreme forms of hatred and rage, which, as we will explore in detail later, are the products of 
their biographical experiences (Bollas, 1995; Stein, 2007), do not want fully and permanently 
to gratify their drives and desires because that would allow them to become satiated. Rather, 
they want to retain the chance of acting them out as many times as possible in the future. 
Although we would support the claim that homicide in private spaces, such as the domestic 
household, requires its own specialised research agenda, a common function shared by the 
private and public space can still be discerned. Namely, that specific types of public space, 
like all private spaces, are conducive to the prolonged concealment of acts of violence.  
 
All killers operate in three major spaces.  While rates of intimate homicide in private spaces 
tend to be consistent (Roth, 2009), interesting temporal and spatial variations can be found in 
rates of homicide between unrelated adults in the two other forms of public space: the liminal 
space, in which the killer can find victims and ‘hide in the light’; and what Papastergiadis and 
Rogers (1996) call the parafunctional space, which provides both victims and prolonged 
concealment. While some urban spaces are vibrant (see Campbell, 2012), parafunctional 
space is ‘dead space’, which no longer performs its appropriate function. However, the 
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important commonality is that these two spaces represent the opposite of discipline 
(Hayward, 2012). A large proportion of urban economic and political activity is simply an 
effort to prevent spaces becoming parafunctional, or perhaps whole urban areas becoming 
‘ghost towns’, a fate that threatens large sectors of once major commercial and manufacturing 
cities such as Detroit in the USA or Liverpool in the UK. Hayward (ibid.) is correct that more 
control and surveillance cannot bring parafunctional spaces back to life, but more pertinent 
here are the processes that create and reproduce these spaces. Atkinson and Parker refer to the 
autotomic production of space as: 
 
[T]he social, political and economic processes through which the costs of maintaining 
‘unruly’ space and state and civil exposure to risk bearing agents are mitigated 
through spatial abandonment and rejection. Prominent examples of such spatial 
practices include policing ‘no-go’ areas (high crime and social disorder zones), urban 
wastelands, derelict buildings, public transport ‘misery lines’ and those spaces tacitly 
understood to be under informal curfew (2011: 2). 
 
For Atkinson and Parker, the state and private sector together construct these spaces by 
practices of social division and expulsion but, more importantly, the mode of control is 
managed through the primary practice of disengagement and the concomitant preferential 
protection of the more salubrious spaces inhabited by higher income groups. This formulation 
presents an alternative to the largely obsolete ‘panopticon’ and ‘net-widening’ discourses that 
still remain popular in criminology. Control is exerted preferentially, which leaves the 
autotomic space amputated from the social body, unattended and unprotected, a shadow-
world in which unseen and unregulated activities can take place. The irony is that this 
autotomic method of control exacerbates the problem of the uncontrollable space; it is a 
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method of what we might call stringent quarantining, shorn of any ethical or even 
commercial ambitions of reform or redevelopment, and the quarantined space is simply cast 
into the shadows. In a nutshell, the autotomic process is a process of exfoliation, shedding 
and abandoning a former part of the urban social body that can no longer be commercially 
exploited or socially controlled. The quarantined parafunctional space is by its nature lifeless, 
disconnected from the urban rhizome until such time that people move in to occupy it, such 
as refugees and immigrants breathing new economic, social and cultural life into abandoned 
or partially abandoned and run-down residential areas.  
 
However, many urban spaces can verge on the parafunctional by day but adopt the role of the 
vibrant liminal space by night – the night-time economy. It is rather counter-intuitive to 
suggest that the abandoned, unattended space and the frenetic, hedonistic liminal space have 
a common characteristic, but of course they share two important properties. Firstly, both are 
resistant to surveillance and therefore offer the potential of anonymity and a relative lack of 
protection for their inhabitants. Secondly, this lack of protection introduces an important 
complementary variable; the increased availability of victims. Perpetrators of serious 
violence, homicide and serial murder take advantage of the vulnerable individuals who can be 
found in the unprotected spaces created by capitalism’s periodic bouts of creative destruction.  
For Winlow and Hall (2006), the British night-time economy is a commercial liminal space 
in which competitive individualism, hostility and violence have become normalised as the 
dark side of alcohol-fuelled fun and hedonism, and over 90 per cent of violent acts go 
unreported and unrecorded. Wilson (2012) points to spaces that exist in a surreal hybrid 
interface between the parafunctional space and the commercial liminal space. These run-
down yet paradoxically vibrant and hedonistic spaces suffer from a lack of guardianship, as 
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the situational crime prevention theorists would have it, but, more importantly, they also act 
as a principal attractor and arena for predator and victim alike. 
 
Wilson et al (2010) discuss the example of Trevor Joseph Hardy, one of a number of British 
serial killers who operated in this hybrid space. Hardy murdered three teenage girls between 
1974 and 1976 in an area of Manchester that was described at the time as ‘economically 
deprived’, which may have contributed to the lack of attention paid to Hardy’s case.  In short, 
several serial killers and their crimes belie Haggerty’s (2009: 174) claim that they are ‘ready-
made for prime-time’. They also belie the orthodox criminological position which claims that 
criminology and the media are interested solely in the conservative/classical liberal agenda of 
individual violence. Hardy is a serial killer of three teenage girls whom he did not know. His 
crimes, victims and personal life – he even had a female accomplice and mutilated his 
victims’ bodies like the infamous ‘moors murderer’ Ian Brady – should fulfil all the 
requirements of ‘newsworthiness’, yet he was almost completely ignored; he was and 
remains ‘unseen’. Wilson et al (ibid.) explain this by noting that Hardy’s victims were 
murdered in a downmarket ‘night-time economy’ zone in a run-down former manufacturing 
region in Northern England, an example of the hybrid liminal and parafunctional space where 
violence is normalised. Because the victims were not prostitutes and therefore lacked a 
common identity that could be used as a hook, the police and the media were slow to make 
connections between the murders and therefore the killer was allowed to prolong his 
concealment. 
 
For over four decades criminology has been focused on the media’s sensationalism and 
concomitant exaggeration of crime rates. Yet Hardy’s case is one amongst a number of 
British serial murders – such as those committed by Kenneth Erskine, Peter Moore and Mark 
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Martin – homicides and assaults in hybrid parafunctional/liminal zones that are consistently 
ignored by the media. Even the more spectacular of these incidents are only briefly 
mentioned in local news and rarely filter through to the national level, which would suggest 
that such violence is constantly understated in the public eye. Wilson (2007; 2012) points to a 
vital aspect of the overall multi-level process: hybrid parafunctional/liminal spaces, the meso-
level products of political, economic and cultural macro-forces operating at the macro-level, 
are public locations where violence and homicide are normalised and predators, products of 
individual experiences at the micro-level, can meet vulnerable victims whilst drawing 
minimal attention to themselves and their acts of violence. 
 
 
Integrating the micro-level: subjectivity in context 
 
Homicide between unrelated adults in public spaces, despite the disproportionate harm and 
fear it causes, is still very much a minority pursuit (Hall, 2012). The tendencies that seem to 
exist amid our probabilistic conditions are built upon relatively small numbers of incidents. 
Although many individuals experience difficult lives in dysfunctional or abusive families and 
impoverished socioeconomic environments, only a small proportion of these individuals 
commit acts of homicide. No move towards an integrated theoretical framework is therefore 
possible unless the complex issue of subjectivity and its relation to violence and homicide is 
unpacked.  The sociologist Michel Weiviorka (2009) has performed a valuable service to this 
integrative project by analysing decades of empirical and theoretical work to provide social 
science with a preliminary typology of the forms of violent subjectivity that operate in 
various micro-spaces. The following motivations and justifications seem to crop up 
consistently as ideal-types across the broad spectrum of violent acts, especially homicide:  
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1. hypersubjectivity, the product of an overload or a plethora of meanings 
2. desubjectivated non-subjectivity capable of surrender to the banality of evil  
3. socially liberated antisubjectivity orientated to cruelty, sadism and violence as ends in 
themselves  
4. subjectivity aimed at conserving its being or its foundation 
 
This typology bears some resemblance to the standard but contested psychological typology 
often used to explain serial killers and other types of methodical killer: visionary, mission, 
hedonistic/sadistic, power/control (Wilson, 2007; 2012; Holmes and DeBurger, 1988) insofar 
as they also revolve around the basic desires to establish meaning, destroy meaning or 
unleash aggressive/sexual libidinal drives without restraint. Bollas (1995), Stein (2007) and 
Dews (2008) argue that these motivations and justifications for violence have common roots 
in an absence of trust in the outside world and a loss of empathy felt toward the individuals 
who populate it, usually the result of severe traumas experienced in the early years of abusive 
and/or negligent childhoods. However, Stein’s (ibid.) research amongst violent prison 
inmates suggests that the difference between the subjective motivations behind harmful 
crime, non-fatal violence, fatal violence and methodical fatal violence could be a matter of 
scale rather than qualitative difference (see also White, 2004). Despite nuances that 
differentiate various subjectivities and situations, the willingness of, say, the state functionary 
or corporate criminal to act in ways that risk harm to others in order to gratify material or 
expressive interests is the same fundamental motivation that drives the methodical killer 
(Hall, 2012). 
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Therefore, what at first glance looks like an impossibly diverse disarray of idiosyncratic 
subjective motivations does, it seems to us, have some rough underlying shape. Of course 
subjective motivations and justifications are still pluralistic and complex, and thus extremely 
difficult to research. Conceptual difficulties are compounded by methodological difficulties 
such as the inability or reluctance of killers and serial killers to articulate and disclose 
personal motivations and justifications (Wilson, 2007). However, if we hold on to the 
epistemological lifeline thrown to us by the basic but still quite useful adumbrated typology 
outlined above, we might be able to at least begin to connect the predominant subjective 
forms it identifies with the meso- and macro-levels.  
 
It is well-known that most killers and perpetrators of serious violence have deeply disturbed 
personal backgrounds. Stein’s (2007) research with prisoners shows that over 80 per cent of 
the prison inmates who had been convicted of fatal and non-fatal violent offences disclosed 
some degree of neglect and/or abuse during early childhood. Dews (2008) and Bollas (1995) 
argue that the young child’s experience of abuse and neglect from primary care-givers 
induces a trauma that results in a complete breakdown of trust at the micro-level. Winlow and 
Hall’s (2009) research amongst violent young men in deindustrialised regions makes the link 
between individual trauma and its cultural reproduction. As localised behavioural codes and 
institutions of mutual support have largely disintegrated, the individual represses and stores 
traumatic and humiliating events in the memory. Mistrusting the words and actions of all 
others with a compulsion that borders on paranoia, he constantly seeks to incite shadow-
events – in the vernacular, the individual ‘looks for trouble’ – in order to release the impotent 
rage that was produced by his inability to act against the initial, formative acts of abuse 
committed against the self (see also Winlow, 2012). Similarly, Stein (ibid.) proposes a scalar 
model of violent dispositions, which suggests that when the initial trauma is extreme and/or 
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protracted it produces a dissociated self which simply seeks to by-pass cognition and moral 
codes to constantly act out the rage that has been inculcated at its neurological core. 
 
The biographical and psychological process that produces trauma and violent dispositions 
resonates with Roth’s work on the decline of trust at the macro-social and macro-political 
level, a relationship that is so directly analogous that it has often been missed in mainstream 
analysis, which tends to depict killers as aberrations, departures from the norm. However, a 
handful of theorists have also made this connection. Stiegler (2009), for instance, comments 
on the journal of French spree killer Richard Durn, an environmental activist who murdered 
eight people in his local town hall. Durn attacked bureaucrats because he regarded the current 
capitalist world as so pan-negligent, abusive and de-collectivised that it could no longer 
recognise individuals, who consequently struggle to recognise their own existence. Stiegler 
(ibid) suggests that this relation of non-recognition has moved beyond everyday mistrust to 
an irretrievable breakdown of the relationship of trust and recognition between the individual 
and the collective in hyper-individualised late-capitalist societies (see also Honneth, 1996; 
Yar, 2012; Hall, 2012).  
 
In a similar vein, a cluster of theorists have suggested that the serial killer – the most 
methodical, instrumental and compulsive of the homicidal types – is not an aberration but the 
purest and most extreme embodiment of the abusive, negligent and exploitative relationship 
between the capitalist socioeconomic system and the individual. Haggerty (2009) argues that 
modernity provides the institutional frameworks, motivations and structure of opportunities 
for serial killing, whilst Seltzer (1998) similarly posits the killer as an individual who hyper-
identifies with capitalism’s underlying drives, logics and relations of exploitation. Duclos 
(1998) portrays the serial killer as the pure and unrestrained subjective embodiment of 
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Western nations’ centuries of domination. This is an individual born of the untrammelled 
will-to-power, whose life is a quest to circumvent the symbolic order’s prohibitions in the 
quest for special liberty, the conviction that one is entitled to act out all pressing drives and 
desires, no matter how extreme, antagonistic and potentially harmful they might be (Hall, 
2012).  
 
The upshot of this set of theories is that the serial killer cuts through everyday hypocrisy to 
act out a pure manifestation of the pre-symbolic human drives – envy, fear, prejudice, hatred, 
sadism, hedonistic pleasure – that fuel the systemic violence of the socioeconomic system 
and its attendant culture of special liberty. Thus it is an extreme scalar form of normality, the 
hyper-normal, more perfectly in tune with the system’s hidden obscene drives of violence, 
negligence and exploitation, which are fetishistically disavowed in public life yet experienced 
by the serial killer first-hand in early life. As the extreme point on the typographical scale of 
killers, the serial killer, alongside the more spectacularly brutal one-off killers and spree 
killers, are all individualised and portrayed as unique aberrations, abnormalities in an 
otherwise benign system populated by morally upright citizens. Yet all of us, as citizens, as 
Žižek (2008; 2010) reminds us, pursue our livelihoods and our security on the back of the 
most horrific acts of organised military violence, the disruption of settled economic 
structures, the systematic exploitation of relatively powerless and vulnerable individuals in 
industrial processes and the negligence of those whose who are no longer required. 
 
This extreme ‘abnormal’ figure, as presented by the media, performs the important dual 
function of distracting attention away from systemic violence and absolving everyday people 
of any blame they might feel over their role in perpetuating it (Žižek, 2008; Taylor, 2010). In 
this general discourse the serial killer is distinguished from the one-off killer – and, at a far 
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greater distance, from the everyday individual – only by the unusual strength of the dual 
drive. This drive seeks, firstly, to act out personal hatred of a dismembered and abusive social 
collective with which he cannot identify. Secondly, it seeks to act out its hyper-conformity 
with the system’s exploitative core drives, which are unleashed by an over-identification with 
the elite cultural value of special liberty that allows the individual to transcend the normative 
restrictions set by the pseudo-pacification process. The relatively rare occasions when serial 
killers are women, who in a traditionally sexist culture occupy a symbolic position of 
passivity, can be portrayed as even more aberrant and thus present the media with enhanced 
opportunities for ideological distraction and absolution.  
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
At the moment the formal and aetiological connections between the three analytical levels we 
have outlined still remain too tenuous and speculative. To make further progress criminology 
must embark on a research programme to produce further empirical evidence at all levels and 
tighten up provisional theoretical concepts with the ambition of constructing a coherent 
theoretical framework. This is especially true of criminology’s current (lack of) theorising 
related to serial murder in its political, socioeconomic and cultural contexts.  However, 
previous research and theoretical works within a structural tradition have produced initial 
ideas that are taking shape in the murk that confronts us.  
 
Empirical studies at the macro-level present us with enough discernable evidence of the 
correlations between temporal and spatial patterns of socioeconomic marginalisation and high 
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levels of homicide between unrelated adults to put forward a probabilistic relationship with 
some confidence. Alongside the well-known factors discussed above we must place the 
crucial macro-cultural factor of variations in the intensity of competitive individualism.  At 
the meso-level of localised space existing in specific periods of time, the autotomic 
production of space provides specific local environments within larger socioeconomically 
marginalised areas where violent offenders can find vulnerable victims and attempt to 
conceal their crimes. In parafunctional spaces, liminal spaces and their hybrid forms, which 
are defined by the absence of effective surveillance and control, perpetrators of violence, 
homicide and serial murders can increase their chances of avoiding attention for long periods 
of time.   
 
At the subjective micro-level, whilst we support Weiviorka’s (2009) request to acknowledge 
the diversity of individuals’ experiences, we suggest that a clear aetiological pattern in the 
formation of types of subjectivity associated with the more brutal and methodical forms of 
public homicide can nonetheless be identified. The majority of perpetrators experience 
traumatic abuse and/or neglect in early childhood. The subsequent breakdown of trust in the 
other individuals who constitute the collective fuels hatred. This hatred can exist in a latent 
form at the macro-level, but the real acting out of repressed rage requires extreme abuse and 
the individual’s additional over-investment in the cultural form of special liberty. Therefore, 
this brutal unleashing of drives in concealed public spaces in the socioeconomic margins does 
not appear to be an aberration but an extreme individualised manifestation of the lack of trust 
and brutality that underlie the unforgivingly competitive Western capitalist system. At its 
cultural and psychosocial heart this system is driven by a pseudo-pacification process, a 
specific form of competitive individualism whose systemic violence and exploitation are 
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concealed by ideological public media discourses and disavowed by citizens who indirectly 
benefit from their functional presence.  
 
Overall, in Western industrialised nations we can see clear patterns relating to the more brutal 
and methodical forms of homicide between unrelated adults at all three levels of analysis – 
the macro, meso and micro – which have been extensively researched in the recent past. The 
difficulty we face lies in constructing adequate analytical connections between the three 
levels and thus laying the foundations for an integrated theoretical framework. What we have 
presented here are two new concepts – pseudo-pacification and special liberty – that 
represent what look like mutually reinforcing processes and forms that constitute dynamic 
relations between the three levels, and, with further empirical research and theoretical fine-
tuning, could potentially be used as cornerstones in such a project.  
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